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CASE NO. 940380-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) (Supp 1993), which
original appellate

grants this court

jurisdiction over appeals from

"orders on

petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons."

Appellant Lettig was originally convicted

second degree felony; therefore, this Court has jurisdiction.

1

ISSUE3 PRESENTED FOR RJEVXEW
1. Did the trial court apply the correct standard of
review in it's examination of the Board's actions.
2.

Did

the

Board

provide

sufficient

portions

of

Petitioner's file to him, pursuant to Labrum, to enable Petitioner
to

adequately

present

his

case

to

the

Board,

and

make

the

appropriate corrections or clarifications.
3.

Did

the

three

Board

members

who

determined

Petitioner's rehearing date, have sufficient accurate documentation
to justify a 1996 rehearing.
4. Did the Board abuse

it's discretion, exceed

it's

jurisdiction or fail to perform a duty as required by law.
5. Did the Board violate Petitioner's Due Process rights
under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The choice of a standard of review, for all issues raised, is
a legal conclusion that this Court can review for correctness.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (utah 1994); State v. Warden. 813
P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991).

STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) (Supp 1993)

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 2, 1993, Petitioner filed this petition for
extraordinary Writ, challenging the actions and decisions of the
Board.

Lettig claimed that the Board had deprived him of his

liberty by revoking his parole and ordering a rehearing for
September 1996, without adequate explanation

of it's reason or

denying parole and exceeding the guidelines. Lettig claimed that
the guidelines created

an expectation

of parole, or liberty

interest, under Utah law which is protected under the due process
clctuses of both the state and federal constitutions that the Board
violated his rights by exceeding those guidelines.
On December 14, 1993, at a hearing, the Court ordered that the
Board grant petitioner a parole hearing

and access to his parole

file in accordance with the Labrum decision.

Subsequently, the

Board provided Petitioner an inadequate and incomplete copy of it's
parole file.
A new hearing before the Board took place January 19, 1994.
The result of the new hearing was that the Board ordered an
additional requirement, a psychological exam of the Petitioner,
prior to any reappearance before the Board.

Such an order was

retaliatory in nature, without adequate support or explanation.
An Evidentiary Hearing was held on April 18, 1994, before
Judge David S. Young.

At the Evidentiary Hearing, the Board

submitted

Petitioner's

entire

Petitioner

submitted

Board

"file"

into

evidence.

into evidence his copy of the material
3

provided to him, pursuant to the Labrum decision, in compliance
with the order of Judge Young.
entire Board file,

It was only after examining the

(submitted as an Exhibit) that the inaccurate

information upon which the decision to grant a 1996 rehearing, was
discovered.
Apparently,

the

Board

based

their

"final" decision

on

inaccurate information as follows:
a. The inaccurate "fact" that this was Petitioner's "sixth"
parole violation.

In truth was, that it was only the fourth.

b. The inaccurate "fact" that Petitioner placed "many
other citizens" life in peril, when he was arrested for Failure To
Stop At Officer's Command. This "fact" was a blatant exaggeration
of the truth, which was never supported by any information or
report.
Petitioner has long felt that he has been the subject of
retaliatory animus on the part of the Board, and was not able to
confirm such a belief, until he was afforded the opportunity to
examine his entire Board file, which was submitted as an exhibit at
the Evidentiary Hearing. The file provided to Petitioner differed
from the information available in the Petitioner's entire file,
which was placed into evidence at the Evidentiary Hearing.

The

entire Board file contains references to the Petitioner as a
"sniveler", and exhibits a personal disregard for the Petitioner,
without benefit of any rationale.

In fact, Board's members Don

Blanchard and Heather Cook stated on 2-13-92, "...could someone
please tell [Defendant] to quit sniveling!" See addendum C.
4

At the Evidentiary hearing, the testimony of Mr. Garner
indicates that while Mr. Garner could remember little else about
Lettig (he did not remember the actual number of previous paroles,
the mitigating circumstances) he did recall that he had discounted
Mr.

Lettig's

expression

of

remorse, without

explanation

or

rationale. Such selective application of an expression by an inmate
demonstrates a pattern of bias, prejudice and unequal treatment.
It was Don Blanchard

who, on July

21, 1993, made the

recommendation to change Petitioner's rehearing date to September,
1996. The same Don Blanchard who one year prior had labeled Lettig
a "sniveler" in his permanent file, and the same Don Blanchard who
caused Mr. Garner to be aware of little else at the evidentiary
hearing, except the fact that he totally discounted Lettig7s
remorse and in fact used Lettig7s expression of remorse as a factor
to

weigh heavily against Lettig in conducting the parole hearing

for Lettig, in January, 1994.
The trial court found that the Petitioner failed to prove any
wrongful conduct by the Board in this case, and concluded that the
Petitioner's case was without merit and should be dismissed.
However, the trial court failed to examine the Petitioner's entire
Board file, and compare it to the information which was made
available to the Petitioner (by the Board), and failed to note that
the testimony of Mr. Garner was not supported by the documentation
in the file.

5

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On November 10, 1992 Appellant Lettig was released from the
Utah State Prison under a parole

agreement signed by the Utah

Board of Pardons and Parole (hereinafter "Board").
On June 4, 1994, Lettig was brought back to the Utah State
Prison and incarcerated, after he plead guilty to a third degree
felony, Failure To Stop At Officer's Command, by Judge Frank G.
Noel. Lettig was also incarcerated with several technical parole
violations; removal of personal ISP monitoring device and failure
to maintain record of residence while on parole.
On July 21, 1993, Petitioner appeared before a single-member
panel of the Board, for a parole revocation hearing. The singlemember was Fred Trujillo, who exhibited such prejudice toward
Petitioner, as to comment on the record that the police (in
Petitioner's third degree felony conviction) should have "taken a
more permanent solution" to the Petitioner's case.
Mr. Trujillo issued an interim decision revoking Petitioner's
parole and ordering that Petitioner's case be scheduled for a
rehearing in September of 1995, to consider the next possible
parole date.

No actual parole date was given.

On or about July 26, 1993, the Board came together at a
meeting and considered Petitioner's case and the interim decision
of July 21, 1993, and modified the September, 1995 date.
rehearing date of September, 1996 was set.

A new

Petitioner was not

present at that meeting and no new evidence or testimony was taken
6

or considered by the Board.

The Rehearing date exceeded the

guidelines, and no adequate, and accurate, explanation has ever
been provided to Lettig.
On November 2, 1993 Lettig filed a Petition For Extraordinary
Relief.

Lettig claimed that the Board had deprived him of his

liberty by revoking his parole and ordering a rehearing for
September of 1996 without an adequate explanation of its reasons
lor denying parole and exceeding the guidelines, and without
adequate access to his file which the Board used to make a final
determination.
On December 14, 1993, the case came before the trial court for
a scheduled evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues pending. At
that time the trial court ordered that Lettig should be permitted
to examine his file, pursuant to Labrum v. Utah Board of Pardons,
and that the Board should conduct a new parole hearing for Lettig,
for the purposes of considering Lettig's parole date.
The Board provided Lettig a partial copy of his file, and a
hearing was held on January 19, 1994, in accordance with the
court's order.

On March 7, 1994 the Appellant requested to amend

his complaint and the request was granted, and the amended petition
was filed with the court.
An

evidentiary

hearing

was

held

on

the

Petition

for

extraordinary relief on April 18, 1994. The actual information upon
which the Board based their "modified"

decision was inaccurate,

and Petitioner was unaware of the inaccuracy - until the Board
submitted the Petitioner's entire file into evidence as an exhibit,
7

at the Evidentiary

(hearing held April 18, 1994) before Judge

Young.
Some of the inaccuracies discovered were not included in the
information in the Petitioner's file which the court ordered the
Board to provide to the Petitioner.

In addition, Mr. Garner

testified that the decision of the Board was based upon prior
convictions, the number of previous paroles (which was an error in
Lettig's

file) and Lettig's

hearings".

"lack of remorse

at the parole

In fact, there is documentation in Lettig's file to

indicate that Mr. Lettig was very remorseful, in fact historically
he did express remorse, and was never arrogant or defiant.
The Court

found that

it was convinced

by Mr. Garner's

testimony. However, the finding of the court are not supported by
Mr. Garner's testimony, and are in direct opposition with Mr.
Garner's testimony. Additionally the findings of the court do not
indicate that the court examined the exhibits (entire Board file of
Lettig, tapes of the hearings, etc).
Although the court did examine the entire Board file enough to
note Lettig was paroled four times in the past twenty (20) years,
and not six (as Mr. Garner and Mr. Trujillo had stated at Lettig's
parole hearings) the court failed to examine the file enough to
reach a determination as to the other inaccuracies, and prejudicial
statements found in the file.

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court did not apply the correct standard of review
in it's examination of the Board's actions.
The Board of Pardons did not provide sufficient portions of
Petitioner's file to him, pursuant to Labrum, to enable Lettig to
adequately present his case to the Board, and make the appropriate
corrections or clarifications, or explanations.

The actual file

reveals that the decision of the Board of Pardons was based upon
inaccurate information, and a general prejudice to Appellant
Lettig, so egregious that it constitutes a
Due Process rights under Article

violation of Lettig's

I, Section

7 of the Utah

Constitution.
The three Board members who determined Petitioner's rehearing
date, did not have sufficient accurate documentation to justify a
1996 rehearing, and comments contained in the file, which were made
by Don Blanchard and Heather Cook, regarding the fact that they
considered lettig a "sniveler", were so inappropriate as to render
the

remaining

Board

members

incapable

of

a

just

and

fair

determination. In fact, the one item of information Mr. Garner was
able to testify to (without looking at the file) was that he
recalled that Mr. Lettig had expressed "appropriate remorse", but
decided to discount the expression of remorse, without reason,
explanation or justification.
The Board of Pardons abused it's discretion, and exceed it's
jurisdiction

by failing to perform their duties as required by
9

law,

and the trial court failed to properly examine Lettig's

claim's in that regard, or the evidence presented to support
Lettig's claim.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY REVIEW EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
BOARD OF PARDONS, THUS THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DEFERRED
TO THE BOARD• THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT MUST BE VACATED.
Appellant Lettig requested that the trial court conduct a
review of the Board7s revocation proceeding and that was done in
the evidentiary hearing held on April 18, 1994.

In substance,

Lettig's rule 65B petition request was a request for an appellate
review of the Board. In re Discharge of JonesP 720 P.2d 1356, 1360
(Utah 1986); Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas and Mining, 765P
2d. 1135, 1139-1140 (Utah 1983) Erkman v. Civil Service Comm'n, 198
P2d 238, 240 (Utah 1948); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818
P. 2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 1991); Vali Convalescent and Care Inst., v.
Dep't of Health, 797 P.2d 438m 443-44 (Utah App. 1988; see

also

Craig v. State, 844 P.2d 1371, 1373, (Idaho App. 1992); (appeal of
district court decision affirming parole commission revocation; In
re Appeal of Banks, 630 P.2d 1131, 1133-34 (Kan. 1981) (appeal of
administrative decision not to build health facility).
Due to the nature of the appeal, the court should have
examined the evidence upon which the Board relied and examined said
evidence for clear error. Norman H. Jackson, 7 Utah Standards
Appellate

Review

of

9, 13 (1994); Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d
10

1282, 1287 (Utah 1993); Kennecott Crop, v. State Tax Comm'n, 858
P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993).

Not only did the trial court fail to

examine the evidence Lettig marshalled, but the evidence the Board
supplied

was

never

examined

for

inaccuracy

or

due

process

violations.
The trial court's resulting obligation (at the evidentiary
hearing) was to examine the evidence marshalled and examine the
board's findings, and the evidence upon which the Board based their
findings, and make a determination as to whether or not the
decision was based upon correct and appropriate information, or
simply the opinion of the Board that Lettig was a "sniveler" who
did not deserve a parole.
The Board never revealed the real reasons for denying Lettig
a parole date. The Board's own rules require that an "explanation
of the reason for [a] decision [be] given and support in writing."
Utah Admin. R. 671-305-2 (1992).

When the Board failed to provide

the actual basis upon which the decision that Lettig should be
given a 1996 rehearing date.
The trial court's findings of Fact, Number 40, found that the
decision not to set a parole date for Lettig was based, in part
upon

"Petitioner's

lack of remorse at the parole hearings".

However, Lettig's file contains a Board Action Routing Sheet,
Parole Violation Hearing, dated July 21, 1993, which states "The
subject did display remorse for his actions
B.

".

See addendum

In addition, Mr. Garner's testimony was not that the Petitioner

Lettig displayed a "lack of remorse", as the trial court's Findings
11

of Fact, Number 40 stated, but, the testimony of Mr. Garner was
that Lettig had "five or six or seven" previous paroles (When in
fact, he had four) and:
"....at prior hearings [Lettig] displayed himself well, and
displayed appropriate remorse and so forth and as a result I think
I, as the person conducting the Hearing this time, tended to
discount those things at the hearing".
Q. Tended to Discount what?
A. His expressions of remorse, expression of intentions to do
better from here on out.
Q. I am a little confused. So your testimony is that even
though he displayed remorse and appropriate affect you discounted
that display?
A. Correct".
(T. at 27)
There simply was not testimony by Mr. Garner's at the
evidentiary hearing, that Lettig was "not remorseful" and the trial
court's finding's in that regard improperly supported the Board's
actions. Appellant Lettig is unable to defend or overcome such
findings by the trial court.
The testimony contradicts the findings.

In short, there is

simply no rationale or explanation for the Board's actions, which
can be supported by either testimony or documentation, and the
trial courts' findings are in error.
The trial Court erred when it did not consider or examine the
fact that any remorseful or contrite statement's made by Lettig may
12

have been considered "sniveling" by Mr. Garner, and in fact he was
punished (by refusing to follow the Utah Sentence and Release
Guidelines) for making any comments relative to his remorse.

The

Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are erroneous
and demonstrate a lack of determination to find out the actual
basis upon which the Board made their decisions regarding Appellant
Lettig.
Mr. Garner also testified that even though Mr. Lettig has only
been paroled three times on his current conviction in 1988, he
considered negatively the fact that Mr. Lettig had been paroled on
another expired sentence. (T. at 55).
Also Mr. Alan R. Walker testified at the evidentiary hearing.
Mr. Walker prepared the report upon which the Board members based
their decision.

The testimony of Mr. Walker was that he prepared

the worksheets for parole violations hearings. (T at 107). Mr.
Walker's report was greatly exaggerated and contained inaccurate
statements. Mr. Walker's report states that Mr. Lettig "endangered
the lives of countless numbers of people in his attempt to escape".
(T at 115). In fact, Mr. Lettig was not the driver of the car, but
a passenger. An unarmed passenger. The "weapon" which the report
refers to is the car itself. There was no documentation submitted
to Mr. Lettig which supported Mr. Walker's baseless statements.
Mr. Walker also testified that his report indicated that Mr.
Lettig had six prior paroles. The Findings of Fact, issued by the
trial court determine that was not accurate. ( T at 116)
Although the trial court did note at Finding of Fact number 5,
13

at page 2, that there had not been six previous paroles, but four.
The Findings of Fact did not address at any point the fact that the
Board of Pardons based

their decisions on a misleading and

inaccurate report, made by Mr. Walker.

However, Mr. Garner did

testify that when Mr. Lettig's counsel attempted to clarify the
situation Mr. Garner consider that to be denial or minimizing the
situation.
If the purpose of Labrum, was to allow for correction and
clarification, and the Board member holds the correction process
against the inmate seeking parole, then the notion of due possess
has been completely abandoned. The result of Mr. Lettig's attempt
to clarify and correct, through both the Board process and the
court system, has been that (without being present at the hearing)
the Board, on it's own initiative, extended his rehearing date
another year in the future. The only occupance, or cause, known to
Mr. Lettig is his singular attempt to seek fair treatment.

The

signal or message from the Board is clear, if an inmate seeks to
correct or clarify, the Board

punishes them and

labels the

punishment it's "right" under the Utah indeterminate sentencing
system.

Such behavior is a blatant violation of due process.

Mr. Lettig marshalled evidence for the trial court that
demonstrated clear error on the part of the Board.
court's resulting

The trial

obligation was then to reject the Board's

findings as incorrect. Crockett v. Crockettr 836 P.2d 818, 820
(Utah App. 1992) (because of failure to marshal evidence, appellate
court assumes record support findings), and also by "elementary
14

principles of appellate review," Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607,
608 (Utah 1976) (in the absence of a record, findings are presumed
to have been supported by admissible, competent and substantial
evidence)

Appellant Lettig demonstrated to the trial court that

the Board's findings could not be supported by the record in his
file and the testimony of Mr. Garner was that he based his decision
in inaccurate information and discounted Mr. Lettig's remorse.
Dased upon the evidence, the decision of the Board could not be
supported by "admissible competent and substantial evidence" .Id. at
607.
In Ward v. Smith, the court adopted a standard of deference to
Board decisions but held that if there exists "a clear abuse of
rightful discretion" the Board results could be overturned.
Ward v. Smith. 573 p. 2d 781, 782 (Utah 1978).

When Mr. Garner

refused to accept a statement of remorse, and counted it against
Mr. Lettig, when Mr. Garner was not even aware of the actual number
of previous paroles, and held an inaccurate number against Lettig,
and when the Board unilaterally imposed an additional year, without
hearing, Lettig's presence, and no event other than Lettig's
attempt to gain access to the court system, via the Writ process,
the Board went way beyond their boundaries and abused their
"rightful discretion".

15

THE BOARD DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PORTIONS OF
APPELLANT'S FILE TO HIM TO ENABLE LETTIG TO ADEQUATELY
PRESENT HIS CASE# TO EITHER THE BOARD OR THE TRIAL COURT.
NEITHER THE BOARD NOR THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE
INACCURACIES OR THE PREJUDICE EXHIBITED, IN THE FILE,
TOWARD THE APPELLANT BY THE BOARD, THUS VIOLATING
LETTIG'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
The Board's counsel placed Lettig's entire file into evidence,
at the evidentiary hearing.

At no time prior to the evidentiary

was Lettig ever able to examine his entire file.

Neither Lettig

nor his counsel were provided adequate access to the file during
the evidentiary hearing, sufficient to examine the file and compare
the file to the "copy" Lettig had received. While the Board could
have simply placed a copy of what was given to Lettig into
evidence, they opted to place the entire, original file into
evidence. Thus, Lettig is now entitled to examine the exhibit and
determine if anything exists in the Board's file which can possibly
explain the Board's prejudicial treatment of Lettig.
The Findings of Fact issued by the trial court do not indicate
that the trial court made a thorough examination of Lettig's file,
nor indicate the trial court had examined each

exhibit,

nor

mention that the portions of the file provided to Lettig differ
considerably, in content, from that which was supplied to Lettig.
In Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909, the Supreme Court of the state of Utah
made a determine that supported the due process rights established
in the Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 7, and stated that due
process "requires that the inmate know what information the Board
will be considering at the [original parole grant] hearing] and
that the inmate know soon enough in advance to have a reasonable
16

opportunity to prepare responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies".
Labrum

further held that the rule applied "to any inmate who

currently had a claim pending in the district court or on appeal
before this court or the court of appeals challenging original
parole grant hearing procedures on due process grounds." Id at 914.
Therefore, the Board abused it's discretion, and exceeded it's
jurisdiction when they failed to perform their duties's as set
forth in Labrum. Additionally, the trial court not only failed to
take note of the Board's inadequate performance with Lettig, the
trial court simply rubber stamped the Board's performance, made
Findings of Fact which cannot be supported by testimony.
While the trial court's Finding's of Fact and Conclusions of
law, #32, at page 7, acknowledged that the trial court had ordered,
and the Board subsequently provided Lettig with a copy of his
parole file, in accordance with Labrum, the findings do not
indicate that the trial court examined the "copy" of Lettig's file
which was placed into evidence by Lettig, and compared it with the
"original" file placed into evidence by the Board.

It was only

through such a comparison, after the evidentiary hearing, that
Lettig's counsel was able to discover that inaccuracies still
remained, corrections had not been made, and that Lettig's original
file had sections (unavailable, and unknown to Lettig) had labeled
Mr. Lettig as a "sniveler". Such remarks and covert communications
between Board members appear to be the actual basis upon which
Lettig's parole status was determined.

It appears to be the basis

upon which Mr. Garner discounted entirely Mr. Lettig's remorse and
17

refused to even consider the fact that Mr. Lettig appeared to be
remorseful.

CONCLUSION

Appellant respectfully requests that the Court vacate the
trial court's order and order that Appellant be granted a new
parole hearing in which accurate information is considered and
further that the Board be instructed to make a fair, impartial
determination, which is supported by competent, accurate,
substantial evidence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 3rd day of February, 1995.

tosemona ~-e±axelock
attorney for Appellant
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I hereby certify that on the y

day of February, 1995, I

caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail postage prepaid, two (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
DEBRA J. MOORE
330

South

300 East

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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ADDENDUM A

[jTOOTE
IflI MAY 1 3 1994 I
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM M. LETTIG,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS
and FINAL ORDER

V,

SCOTT V. CARVER, et al..
Defendants.

Case No. 930906342 HC
Judge David S. Young

The above-entitled matter came before this Court on April 18,
1994, for an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Petition for
extraordinary relief-

The Respondents were represented by Lorenzo

K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, and Petitioner was present
and represented by Rosemond G. Blakelock.

The Court having taken

testimony and evidence in this case, having been fully briefed by
the parties, having carefully considered the facts and evidence of
this case, and having heard

the arguments, issued

its final

judgment. Based upon the above, the Court now makes the following
findings:

giqp;PT(?S p? FACT
1.

Petitioner William M. Lettig is presently incarcerated at

the Utah State Prison and serving two valid indeterminate sentences
of imprisonment: the first for Theft, a second degree felony, and
the second for Evading Arrest\Failure to Stop, a third degree
felony•
2.

Prior

to

the

sentences

Petitioner

is now

serving,

Petitioner was also serving sentences for the crimes of Carrying a
Concealed & Dangerous Weapon, a third degree felony, Attempted
Escape from Custody, a third degree felony, two separate charges of
Attempted Robbery, a third degree felony, and Reckless Driving, a
misdemeanor.
3.

On November 10, 1992, Petitioner was released from the

Utah State Prison under a parole agreement signed by the Utah Board
of Pardons and Parole (hereinafter "Board").
4.

As a condition of that parole, Petitioner agreed to abide

by all the terms and conditions of the parole agreement as set by
the Board, including obedience to federal, state and local laws.
5. This was Petitioner's fourth parole from the prison since
his initial incarceration in December 1975; all prior paroles ended
in revocation because Petitioner failed to abide by the parole
agreements and continued criminal activity and misbehavior while on
parole.
2

6.

On July 21, 1993, Petitioner appeared before a single-

member panel of the Board for a fourth parole revocation hearing•
7.

Petitioner was represented by counsel at that time, and

counsel participated throughout the revocation proceedings before
the Board.
8.
violated

At the hearing, Petitioner pled
four

separate

conditions

of

his

"guilty" to having
parole

agreement,

including having been convicted of a new felony offense while on
parole; Petitioner also pled

"no contest" to a fifth parole

violation allegation.
9. Petitioner's counsel did not object to the Board's actions
while conducting the hearing, and Petitioner submitted the case for
the Board's final decision regarding revocation.
10. The board member conducting the hearing issued an interim
decision revoking Petitioner's parole and ordering that Petitioner
be re-incarcerated at the prison based upon Petitioner's guilty
pleas.
11.

Instead of giving Petitioner another parole date, the

board member ordered that Petitioner's case be scheduled for
rehearing in September of 1995 to consider the next possible parole
date.
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12.

In addition to the above order, the board member issued

a written rationale for his decision, and that rationale contained
the reasons for giving a 1995 rehearing date.
13.

On August 3f 1993, the full Board came together at a

regularly scheduled meeting and considered Petitioner's case and
the interim decision of July 21, 1993.
14.

At that time, the Board adopted the interim decision to

revoke Petitioner's parole date and to re-incarcerate him, but it
modified the 1995 rehearing dated to be 1996.
15 %

Petitioner was not present at that meeting, and no new

evidence or testimony was taken or considered by the Board at that
time.
16.

On November 2, 1993, Petitioner filed a petition for

extraordinary relief, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(c) and (e)
(1993), challenging the actions and decisions of the Board.
17.

In that petition, Petitioner claimed that the Board had

deprived him of his liberty by revoking his parole and ordering a
rehearing for September of 1996 without an adequate explanation of
its reasons for "denying parole and exceeding guidelines."
18. Petitioner asserted that by exceeding the guidelines, the
Board violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
United States Constitution and the analogous clause of the state
constitution.
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19.

Petitioner also claimed that the guidelines created an

expectation of parole (or liberty interest) under Utah law which is
protected under the due process clauses of both the state and
federal constitutions and that the Board violated his rights by
exceeding those guidelines.
20.

Petitioner also claimed that the Board failed to allow

Petitioner the right to present evidence in his behalf and that it
failed to accept evidence in his favor at the parole revocation
hearing.
21.

Petitioner also challenged the ultimate decision of the

Board to grant him a 1996 rehearing; he did not claim that the
Board had failed to provide him access to the Board's files or the
information considered at the hearing.
22. Petitioner requested that the court order "respondents to
rehear petitioner's case and grant him parole within the stated
Guidelines."
23.

On December 14, 1993, the case came before the court for

a scheduled evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues pending
before the court.
24. At that hearing, Petitioner had no witnesses to call but
instead offered a statement to the court raising issues that had
never been raised and were not part of the record.
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25.

Petitioner did not refute the facts put forth by the

Board but argued that the case of Labrum v. Utah Board of Pardons,
227 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah, Dec. 6, 1993), applied to his case and
dhould be considered by the court.
26.

Prior to that date, the Labrum case was not in issue and

was not briefed by the parties.
27.

Based

upon

discussion

with

the parties,

the

court

concluded that Petitioner was entitled to a parole hearing on the
new criminal conviction leading to the parole revocation hearing
and Petitioner's recommitment.
28.

The court also concluded that the Labrum protections

should be applied to that new hearing.
29.

The court ordered the Board to grant Petitioner a parole

hearing to consider the possibility of a future parole date on the
new conviction and to grant Petitioner access to his parole file in
accordance with the Labrum decision.
30. The court stated that the new hearing was not intended to
affect Petitioner's prior guilty pleas before the Board or to
modify the Board's determination to revoke Petitioner's previous
parole date.
31.

The court's stated intention was that the Board hold an

original parole-grant hearing (on Petitioner's new conviction) and
to consider a possible early release date for that conviction.
6

32. Subsequently, the Board provided Petitioner a copy of its
parole file, in accordance with its interpretation of the Labrum
decision, and it reheard Petitioner's case.
33.

The new hearing took place on January 19, 1994, in

accordance with the court's order, the stipulations of the parties,
and R671 of the Utah Administrative Code (1993) .
34.

Petitioner was present at the hearing and represented by

his own counsel, Rosemond Blakelock.
35.

On March 7, 1994, this matter again came before the

court, and Petitioner requested to amend his complaint against the
Board.
36.

The Court granted Petitioner's motion to amend, over

Respondents' objection, and ordered that the amended petition be
filed on March 18, 1994.
37. Respondents were ordered to file an answer to the amended
petition by April 1, 1994, and the case was set for an evidentiary
hearing to be conducted on April 18, 1994.
38.

On April 18, 1994, an evidentiary hearing was held in

this matter, and at that time, the court heard testimony from
numerous witnesses regarding the Board's procedural processes and
actions in Petitioner's case.
39.

Curtis Garner, the board member who conducted the January

1994 hearing, testified that the sentencing matrix contained in the
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Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines is used to calculate minimum
sentence

terms and that numerous other factors must also be

considered when setting a parole date.
40.

Mr. Garner testified that Board's decisions in this case

were affected by Petitioner's prior convictions, the number of
previous paroles and Petitioner's lack of remorse at the parole
hearings.
41.

Mr. Garner testified that the Board routinely deviates

from the guidelines and that the guidelines are only one of many
factors used by the Board in determining an early-release date.
42.

Mr. Garner also testified that the Board does not feel

bound by the guidelines but merely considers the guidelines as a
recommendation, not the actual sentence of imprisonment.
43.

Witness

James

Furner,

a

parole

officer

for

Adult

Probation and Parole, testified that he never told Petitioner that
he [Mr. Furner] intended to see Petitioner serve every year of his
sentence.
44.

Mr.

Furner also denied

Petitioner's

allegations

of

altering the condition of any weapons taken from Petitioner's home
during

or

of any

other

improprieties

Petitioner's case.
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in the supervision of

45.

The

court

finds

that

Mr. Garner

and

Mr.

Furner's

testimonies were convincing, and that they did not demonstrate any
animosity or bias toward Petitioner as alleged in the complaint.
46.

The court also finds that Petitioner has failed to prove

that the Board acted inappropriately in this matter.
47.

The Board's entire records on Petitioner was introduced

as an exhibit, and those records indicate that Petitioner has been
paroled

from his sentence of incarceration on at least four

separate occasions.
48.

Petitioner testified that he did not dispute the fact

that he violated his parole in this case or that the Board was
authorized to revoke his parole based upon the five violations of
the parole agreement.
49.

When asked what proceedings the Board could give him to

make the hearing in his case more fair, Petitioner referred to the
guidelines

but

did

not

identify

any

additional

procedural

protections that should be afforded by the Board.
50. Accordingly, the court finds that Petitioner's claims in
this case go directly against the substance of the Board's ultimate
parole decision, attacking the Board's ability to deviate from the
guidelines in his case, not against the procedural protections
afforded by the Board.

Based upon the above findings of fact, the

court now makes the following conclusions:
9

CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
Petitioner has failed to prove that the Board failed to
perform an act required by law or that the Board has exceeded it
jurisdiction or abused its discretion in this case.

Indeed the

records of the Board show that the Board acted within its authority
under state and federal law and properly applied the guidelines in
Petitioner's case.
The court also concludes that the Board had adequate cause and
justification

to

revoke

Petitioner's

parole, based

upon

his

admitted violations of the parole agreement, and to deny him a
parole date on the new crime of commitment, regardless of the
guideline matrix.
Furthermore, the court concludes that Petitioner failed to
establish that the Board violated his procedural due process rights
under either state or federal law. The guidelines contained in the
Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines are used as a tool to
calculate minimum release dates, and the Board had sufficient cause
in this case to exceed those guidelines based upon Petitioner's
prior paroles and the other circumstances of his case that were
identified by the Board in its written rationale.
Furthermore, the court concludes that Petitioner has failed to
prove or even establish that the Board has abused its discretion,
exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform a duty required by
10

law.

Additionally, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a basis

that would entitle him to the judicial relief requested in his
amended petition.
Based upon the above and the fact that Petitioner has failed
to prove any wrongful conduct by the Respondents in this case, the
court concludes that Petitioner's claims against the Respondents
are without merit and should be dismissed as a matter of law.
Having made the foregoing findings and conclusions, the court
makes the following order:
FINAL ORDER
1.

Respondents' motion for judgment is hereby granted.

2.

The relief Petitioner seeks in his amended petition is
denied as a matter of law.

3.

This case is dismissed with prejudice.

4.

Respondents' motion to seal the Board of Pardons' file
and records from public disclosure is hereby denied.

5.

Respondents' counsel (in the presence of Petitioner's
counsel or representative) is hereby granted permission
of the court to take the Board of Pardons' file, which
was admitted as evidence, from the court for the sole
purpose of making a copy of that record. Upon completion
of copying, the file shall be immediately returned to the
court in its original condition and organization.
11

Dated this "^'fr^a'ay
•Ir^ky of May, 1994.
BY THE COURT,;;

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

ay of May, 1994, I

caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, an exact copy of the attached
(proposed and unsigned) Findings, Conclusions and Final Order to:
ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER
37 EAST CENTER #200
PROVO, UTAH 84606
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ADDENDUM C

Fred Trujillo
BOARD ACTION ROUTING SHEET
PAROLE VIOLATION HEARING
IE: William Lettig

E:

/

USP # 13684

7/21/93

MARY
current matter represents the offender's sixth parole violation. It is very
cerning to note that not only did Mr. Lettig abscond supervision, he was also
/icted of a new Third Degree Felony, Failure to Stop at an Officer's Command; the
ielines of which amount to 24 months. This new conviction is especially aggravated
to the fact that Lettig placed the officer's life in peril, as well as many other
Lzens. (please refer to the attached info.). Based upon the totality of this
lation, the DOC has recommended a five year rehearing. The subject did display
>rse for his actions and did plead for a parole date, however, because this H.O. is of
opinion that Lettig needs time to prove himself, a rehearing, but of a lessor amount
ime will be suggested.
MMENDATION:
efore, my interim decision was to revoke the previous parole date of 11/10/92, and to
est a rehearing in September of 1995, (after the total service of 30 months).
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